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Abstract 
The trolley problem is a moral dilemmas in which human lives are in danger and some, but not all, can be saved by 
direct intervention of a decision-maker. This article discusses three weaknesses of microeconomics with respect to 
individual conduct in the trolley problem: (i) it cannot make predictions; (ii) after observing the conduct of participants 
in an experiment, it cannot explain their decisions; (iii) it cannot suggest policies that ensure the maximization of 
aggregate welfare, nor can it suggest laws that endorse the prevailing observed conduct.
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1. Introduction 
The trolley problem is a moral dilemma (Foot 1978, Thomson 1985, Unger 1996, 
Lanteri et al. 2008, Chelini et al. 2009) in which five human lives are in danger and 
can only be saved by the direct intervention of a decision-maker. The situation is as 
follows: a trolley is running towards five people who will be killed if it proceeds on 
its course. It is possible to save the five people by pulling a lever, which will divert 
the trolley onto a sidetrack. One person stands on the sidetrack, however, and this 
person will be killed if the trolley is diverted. So, the decision-maker is faced with a 
binary choice: action (i.e., pull the lever) or inaction, which result in one or five 
casualties respectively. The trolley problem is a typical moral dilemma, because the 
decision-maker has moral reasons both to act and to not act, but doing both is not 
possible (McConnell 2008). 
What will the decision-maker do? Why? Could that decision be changed? How? 
In  what  follows  I  will  argue  that  mainstream  microeconomics  cannot  answer 
these  simple  questions.  This  article  discusses  three  weaknesses  of  standard 
microeconomics with respect to the conduct of the decision-maker in the trolley moral 
dilemma: (i) it cannot make predictions, (ii) it cannot explain empirical evidence, and 
(iii) it cannot give advice on policy making. 
 
2. Overview 
Economic  orthodoxy  characterizes  individual  action  as  the  rational  pursuit  of  the 
maximal  satisfaction  of  individual  preferences.  Yet,  it  remains  open  as  to  which 
preferences. To be sure, standard microeconomics accounts for ‘private’ actions (Sen 
1985). This means that these actions are characterized by a strict concern with tending 
to  the  agent’s  consumption  (self-centered  welfare),  disinterest  with  regard  to  the 
welfare  of  others  (self-welfare  goal),  and  a  sharp  focus  on  the  agent’s  goals, 
disregarding  whatever  allocation  others  may  value  (self-goal  choice).  While 
‘privateness’  does  not  rule  others  out  altogether,  it  often  leaves  them  with  an 
instrumental role, what is called ‘non-tuism’ (Gauthier 1986, p. 87, 311). Non-tuism 
means that, even when an agent prefers that others behave in a certain way or that 
something befalls them, such preference is independent from what they want, and it 
only holds insofar as those behavior and happenings serve the agent’s satisfaction. It 
has been suggested, however, that non-tuism is “a feature of particular models and not 
an assumption that is essentially built into the economic way of thinking” (Pettit 2001, 
p.  78;  Sen  1982).  Indeed  the  three  formulations  of  privateness  leave  room  to 
significantly different roles for the others (Davis 2007, p. 316): 
Self-centered welfare concerns only an individual’s own satisfaction (or desire 
fulfillment), but self-welfare goal allows other individual’s satisfaction to enter 
into an individual’s satisfaction through sympathy (or antipathy), and self-goal 
choice  allows  for  non-welfarist  goals  that  are  altogether  removed  from  an 
individual’s satisfaction (such as pursuit of social justice). 
Such flexibility, though perhaps praiseworthy under other respects, makes it virtually 
impossible to ascertain ex ante whether in the trolley problem a rational economic 
agent would or should pull the lever. 
 
3. First Weakness: Prediction 
The  maximization  of  aggregate  welfare  requires  that  the  decision-maker  pull  the 
lever, so that five lives get saved. This may be compatible with self-goal choice and 
with self-welfare goal, but hardly with self-centered welfare. A constituent part of 
economic  rational  agency,  however,  is  that  “self-regarding  desires  are  generally 
stronger  than  […]  other-regarding  ones”  (Pettit  2001,  p.  78).  Since  in  the  trolley   2 
problem the individual optimum might be different from the social optimum, a self-
regarding decision-maker might want to refrain from acting (more on this below), 
even in the presence of a sympathetic concern for saving lives. So, it is not easy to 
predict  which  of  these  concerns  actually  prevail,  and  so  which  preferences  will 
ultimately be maximized. 
One  could  perhaps  try  to  use  one’s  insight  to  attempt  a  prediction.  Such  an 
attempt would evoke Max Weber’s notion of Verstehen, or the “understanding from 
within by means of intuition and empathy, as opposed to knowledge from without by 
means of observation and calculation” (Blaug 1980: 43). The notion that introspection 
granted access to individual motivation was common in the early days of economics 
(e.g., Machlup 1955). Ever since the 1950’s, however, economists have abandoned 
the  ‘unscientific’  practice  of  Verstehen.  According  to  most  economists,  nothing 
discloses the authentic preferences of an agent better than her actual behavior: an 
agent’s actions ‘reveal’ her preferences. So, we must observe behavior in order to 
infer preferences, before a prediction is possible. 
Microeconomic theory, therefore, is incapable of making pointed predictions as to 
whether a rational agent would pull the lever or not. Although this is a weakness, 
accurate  prediction  is  not  the  only  desirable  function  of  a  theory  of  individual 
behavior.  The  explanation  of  observed  behavior,  too,  is  desirable  and  may  be 
sufficient to uphold a theory. 
 
4. Second Weakness: Explanation 
As  mentioned,  we  do  not  know  in  advance  which  preferences  rational  decision-
makers  are  maximally  satisfying.  We  thus  ought  to  observe  actual  behavior  and 
subsequently make an inference about preferences that triggered it. If we observe that 
people pull the lever, for example, we can describe their conduct as a manifestation of 
their  preference  for  aggregate  welfare.  Otherwise,  we  account  for  the  data  as  a 
manifestation of self-regarding concerns. As seen, either of those would be a plausible 
economic explanation for each observation respectively. 
In an experimental study of the trolley problem, Lanteri et al. (2008, p. 795ff.) 
found that more than 94% of the participants consider pulling the lever acceptable and 
more than 65% consider doing so morally compelling. Hence, assuming that these 
respondents  did  not  lie  in  the  questionnaire  and  that  they  are  not  lacking  in  will 
power, if they found themselves in a situation of this kind, it is likely that they would 
pull the lever.
1 Therefore, one would be tempted to infer that they are motivated by a 
preference for aggregate welfare and so expect that they always act in the pursuit of 
aggregate welfare. 
In a common variant to the standard problem, the same trolley is running towards 
five people, but this time there are no sidetracks. It is only possible to save the five 
people by pushing onto the track an overweight stranger, who happens to be standing 
nearby and whose mass will be sufficient to arrest the trolley. The stranger will of 
course be killed if pushed on the track. What would a rational economic agent do 
now? 
                                                 
1 It would have been impractical – and perhaps altogether impossible – to arrange  a direct test of 
individual behavior in a setting that mimics the main elements of the trolley problem. The data from 
this  ‘philosophical  experiment’  (e.g.,  Knobe  and  Nichols  2008)  on  the  acceptability  of  alternative 
courses of action nonetheless seem adequate evidence for these preliminary reflections on the ability of 
economic theory to predict, explain, and modify individual behavior in a moral dilemma. For another 
use of philosophical experiment in economics, see Cubitt et al. 2009.   3 
As  above,  we  cannot  predict  but  we  can  explain.  Less  than  46%  consider 
admissible the pushing of the stranger and less than 3% consider it obligatory to do 
so.  Acting  –  and  so  pushing  the  stranger  –  is  required  in  order  to  guarantee  the 
survival of the highest number. However, we now have reasons to believe that, if the 
respondents faced such decision, they would refrain form pushing the stranger onto 
the track. They do not seem to pursue the social optimum. Hence, they can no longer 
be presumed to pursue aggregate welfare. 
I suggested that we could not predict, but in truth we could. Since the responses to 
the two scenarios were prompted in sequence from the same pool of respondents, we 
could employ the preferences inferred from the first scenario to predict the responses 
to the second scenario. The respondents’ preferences were for aggregate welfare, and 
so we would have predicted that they push the stranger just like they pulled the lever. 
Yet, the evidence does not corroborate such prediction. 
Though our prediction failed, we can nonetheless try to explain. Our explanation, 
however,  requires  that  in  this  second  scenario  we  posit  different  preferences  than 
those posited to account for the observations from the standard scenario. In order to 
explain the observations, we must admit that preferences are either volatile or to some 
extent inconsistent. This is problematic. 
We usually infer that a person has certain preferences from seeing the person 
perform an action corresponding to the preferences, and then explain that action as 
stimulated  by  those  preferences.  The  notion  of  preferences,  therefore,  has  been 
criticized as being a circular concept that produces an illusion of an explanation while 
not  really  explaining  anything.  In  the  case  of  revealed  preferences,  circularity  is 
avoided  by  requesting  three  fundamental  properties  of  preferences:  transitivity, 
completeness, and stability (Camerer et al. 2005, p. 10n). When one of the three 
properties  fails,  preferences  become  again  circular.  Therefore,  one  must  posit  the 
stability of preferences to avoid circularity, but if one requires stable preferences it 
becomes  impossible  to  capture  the  evidence  in  the  two  treatments  of  the  trolley 
experiment. 
The seeming problem is a failure to appreciate the nuances in the alternative plans 
one has to enact in order to achieve some results. Assuming the goal of saving five 
lives, the actions required to obtain the goal are judged only on the grounds of their 
efficiency. Perhaps the two actions – pulling the lever and pushing the stranger – have 
different  costs.  For  example,  the  participants  may  account  for  the  risk  of  being 
charged with murder for pushing the stranger. Conversely, the individual costs and 
risks associated with operating the lever are lower. Less than 29% believe that pulling 
the  lever  amounts  to  the  intentional  murder  of  the  one  person  standing  on  the 
sidetrack, but almost 92% consider pushing the stranger a deliberate killing. (Virtually 
all the respondents also believe that intentionally killing somebody is both morally 
and legally worse than letting somebody die.) If the cost of pushing the stranger is 
higher than that of pulling the lever, when both actions grant the same outcome of 
saving five lives, it is plausible that more agents will pull the lever than push the 
stranger, though they have the same preferences. It can also be imagined that the 
participants  have  preferences  which  discriminate  between  the  two  scenarios  and 
which therefore explain the difference in the responses.
2 
Both these possibilities, however, are questioned by additional evidence. Half of 
the participants in the study were administered a different, reversed treatment (i.e., 
they responded to the stranger scenario first, followed by the lever scenario). If the 
                                                 
2 I owe this remark to an anonymous referee.   4 
explanation sketched above were correct, one  should now observe responses very 
similar to those of the previous treatment. The responses to the stranger scenario are 
indeed unchanged: 48% deem the push acceptable and 7% deem it compelling, with 
almost 89% judging it an intentional murder.
3 However, the responses to the lever 
scenario have become puzzling: in the reversed treatment, less than 78% participants 
find the pulling acceptable, just above 11% consider it compulsory, and almost 60% 
now  believe  that  pulling  the  lever  counts  as  an  intentional  murder.
4  Both  the 
explanations that could be invoked to make sense for the asymmetries in the two 
scenarios of the previous treatment now fail to square with the observed responses. 
A second weakness of microeconomic theory is thus that it cannot propose  a 
coherent explanation for these empirical observations.
5 
 
5. Third Weakness: Law and Policy Making 
In  the  trolley  problem,  although  it  is  not  the  most  common  response,  inaction  is 
always  compatible  with  rational  decision-making.  However,  since  the  maximum 
social welfare obtains when five lives are saved, either by pulling the lever or pushing 
the stranger, then perhaps some authority may want to draft a law ensuring that this 
regularly happens. Provided that enough people already pull the lever, achieving such 
goal requires either an increase in the benefits or a reduction in the costs associated 
with deliberately killing someone insofar as this ensures the survival of many others. 
The consequences of such scheme, however, could be dire. Is hunger a problem? Kill 
the undernourished, so the survivors may dine with gusto. Do you want to reduce the 
spread of sexually transmitted infections? Kill the people living with STIs and protect 
the healthy from the threat of contagion…. 
Obviously, no economist would ever recommend doing so. Since interpersonal 
utility comparisons are impossible, it is also impossible to establish whether these 
policies would improve or reduce the overall social welfare. Economists generally 
agree that the preferable state of the world is that in which everybody is either happier 
than, or at least as happy as in every alternative state of the world. In other words, if 
society can unanimously support a policy (i.e., nobody has a reason to veto it), then 
that policy is justified. The problem, therefore, is to identify those policies that only 
affect individuals positively (or neutrally), but never damage them. Policies of this 
kind are called Pareto-efficient. Such is not the case for a policy that invites decision-
makers  to  always  act  in  order  to  save  five  lives  in  the  trolley  problem,  because 
obviously the stranger and the person standing on the sidetrack are affected negatively 
by that policy. 
Moreover, in a scenario such as the trolley problem there is no room for the most 
common alternative to the Pareto criterion: a Kaldorian compensation (Kaldor 1939). 
According to the compensation criterion, although someone is damaged, a policy may 
nonetheless be commendable. This is the case if, after the new state of the world is 
achieved, those who benefit from the policy realize gains larger than the losses of 
those who suffer from it. So that the ‘winners’ can (at least in principle) compensate 
the ‘losers’ but still report a positive net outcome. In the trolley problem, the losers 
are killed by the trolley, so that it is arguably impossible to offset their loss. 
                                                 
3 The differences between treatments are not statistically significant. 
4 All statistically significant at the .05 level (see also Lanteri 2009). 
5 This is clearly a weakness of the Pareto principle and not of microeconomic theory per se. It counts as 
a weakness of economics only to the extent that economists subscribe to it. I owe also this remark to an 
anonymous referee.   5 
A lawmaker striving for popular support may instead try to pass a bill consistent 
with the prevailing rules of conduct in his polity. Therefore, he would want the law to 
stipulate as mandatory the pulling of the lever, but forbid the pushing of the stranger, 
as  a  representative  agent  would  do  anyway.  Many  real  people,  however,  are  not 
representative  agents.  In  the  reversed  treatment,  for  instance,  over  22%  believe 
pulling  the  lever  unacceptable  and  over  7%  say  pushing  the  stranger  is  morally 
compulsory, so they would presumably break the law. Moreover, Chelini et al. (2009) 
employ the dataset from a different trolley problem experiment to show that indeed 
the most common pattern of responses is ‘pull the lever but don’t push the stranger’. 
Yet,  60%  of  the  participants  deviate  from  the  pattern  at  least  once  over  three 
repetitions with modest variants of the standard dilemma, so that they, too, would 
presumably break the law. Even a bill deliberately designed to capture the prevailing 
behavior, therefore, may send the majority of people before a court. 
What one could regard as a third weakness of microeconomic theory with respect 
to the trolley problem, therefore, is that it does not empower specific policies. 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
The trolley problem and its variant are moral dilemmas in which human lives are in 
danger  and  some,  but  not  all,  can  be  saved  through  the  direct  intervention  of  a 
decision-maker. Standard microeconomics reveals three weaknesses with respect to 
the conduct of the decision-maker in the trolley problem: it cannot predict whether 
she  will  act  or  not;  after  observing  the  conduct  that  may  be  inferred  from  the 
judgments  expressed  by  the  participants  in  an  experiment,  moreover,  it  cannot 
individuate  the  preferences  that  explain  their  decisions;  finally,  it  cannot  suggest 
policies that ensure the maximization of aggregate welfare, nor can it suggest laws 
that endorse the prevailing conduct. 
Taken separately, none of these weaknesses would raise serious concerns, as it is 
understandable  that  a  theory  be  successful  at  addressing  some  aspects  of  some 
phenomena,  and  not  all.  Together,  however,  the  three  weaknesses  question  the 
capacity of economics to contribute to our understanding of human behavior in moral 
dilemmas. Such failure to address human behavior in moral dilemmas constitutes a 
problem for economics. 
The recognition that reciprocity and fairness often drive individual decisions (e.g., 
Fehr  &  Schmidt  1999)  and  the  growing  importance  of  ethical  concerns  in  the 
economic domain (e.g., consumer boycotts in response to corporate moral violations, 
the focus on social responsibility and socially responsible investments, …) invite a 
better understanding of the ways in which the moral judgments of economic agents 
affect their preferences. A failure to do so would question the ability of economics to 
claim its title of science of decision-making at large, being instead only applicable to 
narrow contexts in which material incentives prevail and moral ones are unimportant. 
The economic model of decision-making owes much strength to its capacity of 
being  “applicable  to  all  human  behavior”  (Becker  1976,  p.  8,  emphasis  added), 
because “all human behavior can be viewed as involving participants who maximize 
their utility from a stable set of preferences and accumulate an optimal amount of 
information and other inputs in a variety of markets.” Denying such generality would 
force economists to accept a lesser role for their discipline. It does not seem likely that 
many  economists  would  easily  accept  such  limitation,  in  a  time  when  the  novel 
strands of pop economics (e.g., Frank 2007, Harford 2008, Landsburg 2007, Levitt 
and Dubner 2005) herald a new age of ‘economics of everything’ to side with the 
traditional academic ‘imperialism’ of economics (Mäki 2009).   6 
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